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Abstract
This paper presents the evolution of the IMF lending arrangements approved between 1953-2013. The study covers both non-
concessional and concessional loans. The findings show that the volume of the IMF loans has fluctuated significantly and the value
of the IMF lending has increased over a period of economic or financial crisis, as the debt crisis of the 1980s, the Tequila crisis in
1994-1995, the Southeast Asia crisis in 1997-1998, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1998-1999 and Argentina in 1999-2002 or the global
financial crisis since 2008.
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One of the main roles of the IMF is to finance its member countries in order to solve their balance of payments
problems or budget difficulties.
The IMF's main source of financing is representing by quota subscriptions of member countries. To cope with
crisis situations influencing the stability of the international monetary system, the Fund can supplement these resources
through two standing multilateral borrowing arrangements - the expanded New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) and
the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB).
According to the IMF (IMF, 2013a), the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) was adopted in January 1997 and
became effective in November 1998. In March 2011 the NAB was amended, by increasing the maximum amount of
resources available to the IMF under the NAB to SDR 370 billion (about USD 564 billion), from SDR 34 billion under
the original NAB.
The NAB is a set of credit arrangements between the IMF and 38 member countries and institutions, including a
number of emerging countries (Brazil, Canada, China, Cyprus, Danmarks Nationalbank, Deutsche Bundesbank,
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Finland, France, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, National Bank of Poland, Russian Federation, Chile,
Banco de Portugal, Bank of Israel, Belgium, Australia, Austria, Banco Central de Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South
Africa, Spain, Sveriges Riksbank, Swiss National Bank, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States of America).
The NAB has been activated six times:
• in December 1998, to finance a Stand-By Arrangement for Brazil, when the IMF called on funding of SDR
9.1 billion, of which SDR 2.9 billion was used;
• in April 2011, for the maximum period of six months in the amount of SDR 211 billion;
• in October 2011 for the maximum period of six months;
• in April 2012 for the maximum period of six months.
• in October 2012 for the maximum period of six months;
• in April 2013 for the maximum period of six months.
According to the IMF (IMF, 2013a), the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) was established in 1962 and
expanded in 1983 to SDR 17 billion, from about SDR 6 billion. The GAB can be used in limited cases, to borrow
specified amounts of currencies from 11 industrial countries or their central banks (Belgium, Canada, Deutsche
Bundesbank, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sveriges Riksbank, Swiss National Bank, United Kingdom, United
States), under certain circumstances. Specifically, a proposal for calls under the GAB may only be made when a
proposal for the establishment of an activation period under the NAB is not accepted by NAB participants. It has been
activated ten times, the last time in 1998.
The IMF provides non-concessional loans through: Stand-By Arrangements (SBA) for short-term balance of
payments problems; Flexible Credit Line (FCL) - that replaced the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in March
2009 - for liquidity needs of member countries with very strong fundamentals, policies, and track records of policy
implementation; Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) - that replaced the Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) in
November 2011 - for liquidity needs of member countries with sound economic fundamentals and policies which do
not meet the qualification requirements for the FCL; the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for medium and long term
balance of payments problems; and the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) to all members facing urgent balance of
payments needs.
Low-income countries may borrow on concessional terms under the new Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust
(PRGT) arrangement through: the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) that replaced the Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (PRGF) in January 2010 - for long term balance of payments problems, including in times of crisis; the
Standby Credit Facility (SCF) for short term balance of payments needs; and the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) for
urgent balance of payments need. Concessional loans carry zero interest rates until the end of 2013 (2012 for SCF
loans).
Since 2009, according to the IMF (IMF, 2009a), its lending framework has changed in order to better support
countries in the global crisis and as a result of strong pressure to reform thus:
- increasing its lending capacity;
- reforming the terms of the concessional loans to low-income countries (structure, conditionality) to become
highly concessional;
- improving the non-concessional lending framework;
- modernizing the conditionality for all borrowers;
- enhancing the flexibility of the traditional stand-by arrangement;
- eliminating seldom-used facilities;
- establishing new lending facilities that rely on ex-ante conditionality.
Moreover G20 agreed in April 2009 to triple the Fund’s lending capacity to USD 750 billion the resources available
comparing with the total pre-crisis lending resources of about USD 250 billion.
So we can talk about a progress in IMF financial aid to provide better targeted and more flexible lending. The 2011
IMF Review (IMF, 2011, 2012) analyzed the IMF-supported programs signed in the period 2002-September 2011 and
found that the conditionality has been better tailored to country needs, streamlined and focused on core areas of Fund
expertise. A review of the IMF lending practices changes implemented recently is done by Edwards and Hsieh (2011).
In the period 1953-2012 there were large fluctuations in the number of IMF non-concessional and concessional
loans as it can be observed in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Furthermore the IMF has developed various loan instruments for
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its members. Nevertheless the SBA represents more than 70% of total IMF lending (871 arrangements from a total of
1212 in the same period).
Figure 1. Number of arrangements (non-concessional) approved during financial years ended April 30, 1953-2012
Number of concessional arrangements (210 in 1953-2012, representing 17.3%)
is significantly lower than the non-concessional ones (1002, representing 82.7%).
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Figure 2. Number of arrangements (concessional) approved during financial years ended April 30, 1989-2012
Using the IMF History of Lending Arrangements database we observe that from 153 emerging and developing
countries according to the World Economic Outlook country classification (IMF, 2013b) 119 have received IMF
financial support at least once from May 01, 1984 to May 31, 2013. There are 34 exceptions: Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei-Darussalam, Iran, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Sudan, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria,
Timor-Leste, Eritrea, Fiji, Micronesia, Montenegro, Myanmar, Namibia, Oman, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, United
Arab Emirates and Vanuatu.
The total amount of lending committed under these arrangements (non-concessional and concessional) has
increased roughly in crisis times (Figure 3 and Figure 4).
Figure 3. Amounts committed under arrangements (non-concessional) approved during financial
years ended April 30, 1953-2012 (in millions of SDRs)
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Figure 4. Amounts committed under arrangements (concessional) approved during financial years ended
April 30, 1953-2012 (in millions of SDRs)
The IMF lending increased in a period of crisis, as the debt crisis of the 1980s, the Tequila crisis in 1994-1995, the
Southeast Asia crisis in 1997-1998, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1998-1999 and Argentina in 1999-2002 or the global
financial crisis since 2008. Countries often need financing to solve their balance of payments problems or budget
difficulties.
Among the authors who have examined the role of the IMF over an economic or financial crisis period we can
remember: Gaidar (1997), Odling-Smee (2006) – the IMF and Russia; Jonas (1999) – the Fund's approach in Asian
crisis that is found different from previous crises; Boughton (2000) – the involvement of the IMF in the exchange
crisis that hit Mexico in December 1994; Boughton (2001) – the IMF's response to Egypt's nationalization of the Suez
Canal in 1956 that the author considers similar to financial crises in the 1990s; Grenville (2004) – the IMF and the
Indonesian crisis; Damill, Frenkel and Rapetti (2005) – the relationship between Argentina and the IMF; Ito (2007) –
the IMF package for Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea during the Asian currency crisis in 1997-1998 that is
appreciated to be too small; Lipsky (2008), Grabel (2011), IMF (IMF, 2009b), Barkbu, Eichengreen and Mody (2012)
– the IMF's response to the global financial crisis.
The global financial crisis has led to an increase in IMF arrangements. In the period 2008-2012, during financial
years ended April 30, the IMF has approved 53 non-concessional arrangements (in a value of SDR 320 billion),
compared with 41 during the Tequila crisis in 1994-1995 (in a value of SDR 17.6 billion) or 29 during the 1997-1998
Asian crisis (in a value of SDR 34.8 billion). The average size of non-concessional arrangements approved during the
IMF's 2011 financial year was SDR 9.9 billion and SDR 7.6 billion for IMF's 2012 financial year, compared with
SDR 1.2 billion during the Asian crisis.
Some countries were vulnerable from the beginning of the crisis and entered into an IMF-supported program in the
fourth quarter of 2008, forming the first wave of countries turned to the IMF for financial support in the period 2008-
2009. A second group of countries sought IMF assistance in 2010-2011 and the third group in the interval 2012-2013.
Some countries entered into consecutive IMF non-concessional programs in 2008-2013 as it can be observed in Table
1 (Pakistan, Ukraine, El Salvador, Serbia, Armenia, Mexico, Colombia, Poland, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Jamaica, Greece, Kosovo).
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Table 1. Countries entered into an IMF non-concessional program in the period 2008-2013
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Georgia September April
Hungary November
Iceland November
Pakistan November September
Ukraine November December July
Congo December
Latvia December
Belarus January
El Salvador January March
Serbia January September
Armenia March June
Costa Rica April
Guatemala April
Mexico April March January November
Mongolia April
Colombia May May May June
Poland May January January
Romania May March September
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
July September
Sri Lanka July
Angola November
Dominican
Republic
November
Maldives December
Seychelles December
Moldova January
Iraq February
Jamaica February May
Greece May March
Antigua and
Barbuda
June
Kosovo July April
Honduras October
Ireland December
Macedonia January
Portugal May
St. Kitts and
Nevis
July
Jordan August
Moroco August
Cyprus May
Tunisia June
Source: IMF, IMF History of Lending Arrangements database, 2008-2013
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In the period 2008-2013, the IMF has committed SDR 326.3 billion in loans to its member countries. IMF
non-concessional lending was distributed across regions, including countries from Europe and the CIS region
(Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Kosovo, Latvia,
Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Ukraine), Latin America and the Caribbean (Antigua and Barbuda,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, St. Kitts and
Nevis), Asia (Iraq, Jordan, Maldives, Mongolia, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Tunisia) and Africa (Angola, Congo,
Seychelles). Most of these are developing or emerging countries. In the same time, many low-income countries used
the IMF’s concessional lending facilities.
As a conclusion, compared with previous crisis IMF programs, since 2008 the financing was larger, different
countries that have been hit by the financial crisis asking for the IMF financial support to solve their balance of
payments problems or budget difficulties.
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